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Abstract 
Lack of pretense in children with autism has been explained by a number of 
theoretical explanations, including impaired mentalising, impaired response 
inhibition, and weak central coherence. This study aimed to empirically test each of 
these theories. Children with autism (n=60) were significantly impaired relative to 
controls (n=65) when interpreting pretense, thereby supporting a competence deficit 
hypothesis. They also showed impaired mentalising and response inhibition, but 
superior local processing indicating weak central coherence. Regression analyses 
revealed that mentalising significantly and independently predicted pretense. The 
results are interpreted as supporting the impaired mentalising theory and evidence 
against competing theories invoking impaired response inhibition or a local 
processing bias. The results of this study have important implications for treatment 
and intervention.  
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Impaired Competence for Pretense in Children With Autism: Exploring Potential 
Cognitive Predictors.   
Lack of pretend play is a manifest behavior that is particularly significant in autism 
symptomatology and in early diagnosis (APA, 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1996). 
While the presence of such a deficit is undisputed (see Jarrold, 2003), the cause or 
causes remain controversial (Boucher, 2009). A number of theoretical explanations of 
the deficit have been advanced but empirical validation of competing theories is 
lacking (Rutherford, Young, Hepburn, Rogers, 2007). The main aim of the research 
reported here was to address this issue in an empirical investigation of relationships 
between pretend play and, respectively, mentalising ability, response inhibition and 
drive for central coherence. If deficits in pretense were found to be linked to problems 
with any or all of these cognitive abilities, this would provide an insight into what 
might underlie the problems that children with autism encounter with pretense. This 
would have important implications for intervention aimed at facilitating pretense. 
Given the importance attributed to pretend play in the development of language and 
social cognition (Lillard, 2002) there is a clear need to gain a better understanding of 
the pretend play impairment.    
 
Impaired Mentalising?  
In a seminal paper, Leslie (1987) proposed that the ability to engage in and recognize 
pretend play requires the capacity to simultaneously hold two representations in mind, 
the primary representation (reflecting the real world) and the new pretend identity, 
which is a representation of the primary representation (what Leslie called the 
“metarepresentation1” and later the M-Representation; Leslie & Roth, 1993). 
According to Leslie, this capacity to represent representations emerging during the 
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second year of life also underlies the later more advanced ability to understand other 
people’s minds, known as a theory of mind, which develops around the age of four 
years. Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to ascribe mental states to self and others 
and to predict behavior on the basis of these states (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Using 
measures assessing the ability to attribute false beliefs to others, ToM has been 
robustly demonstrated to be impaired in children with autism (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & 
Leekam, 1989). This ToM deficit reflects a difficulty in mentalising: in the case of 
tests of false beliefs, the child is unable to represent in their own mind someone else’s 
false belief as separate from their own true belief.  
According to the original version of the ToM theory, children with autism 
demonstrate impairments in both pretense and ToM as a result of an underlying basic 
difficulty in forming and manipulating secondary representations. Thus, children with 
autism therefore lack the competence to understand and produce pretense. In contrast 
to pretend play, functional play does not pose a problem because it is not underpinned 
by the need to form secondary representations. Instead, primary representations are 
sufficient for functional play because the world is simply represented as it is (Baron-
Cohen, 1987).  
There is empirical evidence in support of a link between pretend play and 
ToM in typically developing children. For example, Taylor and Carlson (1997) and 
Suddendorf, Fletcher-Flinn, and Johnston (1999) found that children who passed ToM 
tasks produced significantly more imaginary object pretense than children who failed 
these tasks. Moreover, in a study of children with autism and matched controls, 
Rutherford et al. (2007) found that development in the production of pretend play 
could be predicted by earlier measures of joint attention. Joint attention is believed to 
directly reflect a capacity for mental representation (Baron-Cohen, 1989) and is 
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precursor to ToM development (Rochat & Striano, 1999). To date, however, there has 
been no direct investigation of the link between the ability to understand – as opposed 
to produce - pretense and mentalising ability in children with autism. This is an 
important omission because measures of production do not permit investigation of 
any underlying competence that might be masked by a performance deficit (Jarrold, 
Smith, Boucher, & Harris, 1994b). One of the main aims of the current research is to 
make such direct investigation.   
 
A Problem of Inhibition? 
The observation that children with autism show an improved capacity for pretence 
under instructed or elicited conditions (Lewis & Boucher, 1988) challenged the 
characterization of impaired pretence in autism as a competence deficit. Additionally, 
children with autism were found to have no difficulty comprehending the pretend play 
of another person (Jarrold et al., 1994b; Kavanaugh & Harris, 1994). These findings 
seriously challenged the impaired mentalising explanation of lack of pretense, which 
entails a competence deficit. It was therefore suggested by Harris (1993) that a 
selective impairment of the spontaneous production of pretend play might result from 
a performance deficit and in particular from impaired response inhibition. 
Specifically, Harris argued that when engaging in pretense the pretender must inhibit 
their real-world knowledge and act ‘as-if’ something is the case, and that impaired 
response inhibition would interfere with this ability.  
More recent evidence, however, suggests that there is in fact lack of 
competence – not just a performance deficit – for pretend play in children with 
autism. Rutherford et al. (2007) showed that both spontaneous (performance measure) 
and scaffolded pretense (competence measure) was significantly impaired in children 
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with autism relative to matched controls. In addition, Bigham (2008) reported that 
children with autism were more likely than ability-matched controls to make literal 
errors when interpreting another person’s pretend gestures. Bigham’s finding does 
not, however, preclude a role for impaired response inhibition: it is consistent with 
response inhibition impairment and with combined competence-performance 
impairment. A further aim of the current research was to investigate a possible 
association between impaired response inhibition and children with autism’s problems 
interpreting - as opposed to producing – pretend play.  
 
A Local Processing Bias?  
The ‘weak central coherence’ theory (Frith, 1989; 2003) proposes that individuals 
with autism have anomalously good ability to perceive parts or focus on detail (local 
processing) but impoverished ability to perceive wholes (global processing) relative to 
neurotypical individuals. Support for the notion of a local processing bias in 
individuals with autism comes from a plethora of studies demonstrating superior 
performance relative to matched controls on tasks such as the Embedded Figures Task 
(EFT: Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, Karp, 1971) in which a simple shape must be 
identified from within a complex whole. Despite robust evidence of strong local 
processing, evidence of impaired global processing is mixed (e.g. Motron, Burack, 
Stauder, & Robaey, 1999). Consequently, Happé and Frith (2006) revised Frith’s 
hypothesis to emphasize an unusually strong preference for utilizing local rather than 
global processing strategies.  
It has been suggested that weak central coherence can explain the poor 
performance of children with autism on ToM tasks (Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, & 
Jiminez, 2000). Weak central coherence has also been advanced as an explanation for 
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impairments in the pretense of children with autism (Morgan, Mayberry, & Durkin, 
2003). If children with autism do find it difficult to integrate several pieces of 
information then it is plausible that they may fail to encode and relate all of the 
available cues when observing the pretense of another person. In other words, they 
may fail to take into account the context in which the non-literal acts are performed. 
Functional play would not pose a problem because successful comprehension can be 
achieved simply by knowing the behaviors conventionally associated with objects and 
situations. To date there are no empirical studies investigating the relation between 
global processing and the ability to pretend, and there is only one known investigation 
of the relationship between local processing and pretence (Morgan et al., 2003). 
While Morgan et al. failed to find an association between pretense and local 
processing, they also failed to find evidence of impaired pretend play in children with 
autism, making their results somewhat difficult to interpret. The possibility that a 
local processing bias can help to explain lack of pretense in children with autism 
therefore requires further empirical investigation.   
 
The Current Study 
The first two preliminary aims of this study were:  
1. To replicate the results of the earlier study (Bigham, 2008) in which children with 
autism showed a pattern of intact comprehension of functional play but impaired 
comprehension of pretend play relative to controls, thereby distinguishing between a 
competence deficit hypothesis and a performance deficit hypothesis. 
2. To replicate previous research showing that the performance of children with 
autism relative to controls is impoverished on measures assessing (a) mentalising and 
(b) response inhibition, but superior on a measure of (c) local processing. 
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The third major aim was to: 
3. To assess relationships between comprehension of pretense and, respectively, 
performances on measures of (a), (b) and (c). If meaningfully associated, measures of 
each underlying cognitive ability should correlate with the measure of pretend play: 
measures of (a) and (b) should show significant positive correlation and (c) should 
show significant negative correlation with the measure of pretense. 
A subsidiary aim was to investigate whether or not children with autism make 
more literal errors relative to controls when interpreting pretense; and if more such 
errors are made, then to assess whether or not literal errors are specifically associated 
with impaired response inhibition. This will provide a further test of the proposed 
association between impaired response inhibition and impaired pretense in children 
with autism.   
 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were 60 children with autistic disorder (AD), 28 children with 
intellectual disability (ID) without autism, and 37 typically developing children (TD) 
matched for verbal age (VA) using the British Picture Vocabulary Scales (BPVS; 
Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintilie, 1982). The children were recruited from schools 
within the Greater London (UK) area and none of the children had previously 
participated in any of the earlier studies conducted by the author. The children with 
autism attended specialist schools catering for autism and all had been diagnosed with 
autism by experienced psychiatrists and clinical psychologists using DSM-IV (APA, 
2000) criteria. The TD children attended local mainstream schools and were described 
by their teachers as having no prior or current social, emotional or cognitive 
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problems. The children in the ID group were selected from special needs schools and 
inspection of their statements of Special Educational Needs as well as discussions 
with their teachers indicated that none had any prior or current autistic behavior. All 
of the children had a receptive VA between 4 and 7 years. The three groups were 
compared on chronological age (CA) and VA. Table 1 shows the means for each 
group. The VA for the groups was not significantly different, F (2, 124) = .17, n.s. 
The difference between the three groups on CA was significant, F (2, 124) = 72.86, p 
< .001, with the TD children younger than the other two groups.     
[Place Table 1 about here] 
Measures 
Comprehension of functional play and pretend play. The materials and 
procedure are identical to those reported elsewhere and are therefore only presented 
briefly below (Bigham, 2008; Bigham & Bourchier-Sutton, 2007). The task requires 
children to watch a series of six pretend actions such as writing enacted using either: 
(a) real or replica objects (functional play); or using (b) substitute objects or (c) no 
objects all (pretend play). There were four different types of substitute object 
representing gradually more difficult substitutions. These ranged from simple 
substitutions where the substitute was similar in size and shape to the referent and 
with no clear intended function (e.g. appropriately shaped wooded objects) to 
completely arbitrary substitutions where the substitute shared no similarity with the 
referent and had its own clearly defined, different function (e.g. a spoon used as if it 
were a saw). The actions and the props used to assess functional play and object 
substitution pretense are shown in Table 2. Two different types of gestures were used 
to assess children’s understanding of pretense performed without any substitute 
objects. These were body-part-as-object gestures (e.g. using one’s finger as if it were 
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a pen) and imaginary object gestures (e.g. pretending to hold an imaginary pen). In 
total seven levels of play were assessed. 
[Place Table 2 about here] 2 
Procedure. The children were seen individually at their school. To avoid 
fatigue and practice effects each child was presented with only three of the possible 
six pretend actions for each of the seven levels of play. The subsets of actions for each 
type of play were systematically selected and predetermined on each child’s response 
sheet. This ensured that the children within each participant group received similar 
numbers of the different actions. The children were always presented with an action 
performed using a real or replica object first thereby increasing the likelihood that the 
child’s first response would be correct. This was to minimize the possibility of failure 
effects. All the remaining items were presented in a random order, the exception that 
consecutive actions or levels of play differed.  
The experimenter sat at a table next to the participant and performed the 
actions one at a time. While viewing each action the children were asked a series of 
questions. First, each participant was asked, “What am I doing?” If this did not elicit a 
response the question was re-phrased, “What am I pretending to do?” Again, if the 
participant did not respond then the child was asked, “What am I pretending the 
(object) is?” If the participant was unable to answer any of the questions then the next 
action was presented. Testing lasted around 25 to 30 minutes.  
Scoring. Correct responses were awarded one point. Incorrect responses and 
non-responses were awarded a score of 0. Scores ranged on a scale from 0 to 3 for 
each level of play. In order to analyze the types of mistakes the children made, 
incorrect responses were coded as literal or non-literal. Literal errors were either 
function or action based. Functional errors involved the children responding on the 
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basis of the actual function of the substitute. To illustrate, “stirring” was used to 
describe the sawing action when a spoon was used and “screwing” was used to 
describe the writing action when a screwdriver was used. Action based errors 
involved the children merely describing the physical behavior carried out by the 
experimenter (e.g. “pushing the saw” and “waving your hand”).  
 
Mentalising (false belief). Following the procedure of Perner et al. (1989), the 
children were shown a Smarties tube and were asked, “What do you think is in here?” 
The experimenter then said, “Let’s open it and have a look” The experimenter opened 
the tube to reveal a pencil and said, “Oh, what’s really inside?” All of the children 
responded correctly to these two control questions. The children’s understanding of 
their own and another’s false belief was then assessed as follows. The pencil was put 
back inside the tube and the children were asked, “When you first saw this, before we 
opened it, what did you think was inside?” If any of the children did not respond they 
were given a forced-choice question, “Before we opened the tube, what did you think 
was inside, Smarties or a pencil?”  Finally, the children were asked, “What will 
(familiar person) think is in it?” If any of the children did not answer or said they did 
not know they were given a forced-choice question, “What will s/he think is inside? A 
pencil or Smarties?” The structure of the forced choice questions was 
counterbalanced as it was felt that some of the children might simply echo the last of 
the two options. Correct responses were awarded one point and incorrect or non-
responses were not awarded any points. Scores ranged on a scale from 0 to 2.   
 
Response inhibition (Luria hand game). The procedure used in this study is 
identical to that reported by Hughes (1996). In brief, the children were first presented 
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with an imitative task in which they copied hand gestures (pointing a finger and 
making a fist) made by the experimenter. None of the children failed this control task. 
They were then presented with a conflict task in which the children were instructed to 
make a different gesture to that made by the experimenter (e.g. pointing a finger when 
the experimenter made a fist). The instructions were repeated with corrective 
feedback when necessary until the child made 4 consecutive correct responses. Five 
of the children with autism and one child with ID were excluded at this point. At test 
the children were presented with a predetermined set of fist and finger trials. Children 
were not given feedback on their responses. Testing was terminated if a child made 
six consecutive correct responses. Each child was presented with a maximum of 15 
trials. Responses to the imitative task were scored according to the proportion of 
correct responses out of the total number of trials presented.  
 
Local processing (Children’s Embedded Figures Task). The children were 
given the Children’s Embedded Figures Test (CEFT; Witkin et al., 1971). The test 
requires the participants to locate a target figure within a series of line drawings. The 
procedure was identical to that described in the test manual. In brief, the children were 
instructed to search for the target in each picture and then trace the outline with their 
finger. One of the children with autism failed the pre-test and was excluded from the 
analyses. The children were given a score, ranging from 0 to 25, depending on how 
many test items they successfully located. Due to problems with absences 7 TD, 2 ID, 
and 11 children with autism did not complete the CEFT.  When these children were 
excluded, the groups remained matched for VA.  
 
Results 
  
13 
Results are reported under three headings corresponding to the aims of the study: (a) 
Do children with autism show a pattern of intact comprehension of functional play but 
impaired comprehension of pretend play relative to controls? (b) Do children with 
autism show impaired mentalising and response inhibition but superior local 
processing relative to controls? and (c) Can performances on measures of mentalising, 
response inhibition and local processing predict comprehension of pretense?  
The participant groups were equated for VA therefore, following Miller and 
Chapman (2001), in the statistical analyses that follow VA was entered as a covariate 
only when VA correlated with the dependent variables.   
 
Do Children With Autism Show a Pattern of Intact Comprehension of Functional Play 
but Impaired Comprehension of Pretend Play Relative to Controls?  
The first question of interest was whether there were between-group differences in 
understanding of functional play and each level of pretend play. A series of one-way 
analyses of variance (ANOVA) using an alpha level of .007 (Bonferroni adjusted for 
multiple comparisons) were performed. There were no significant group differences at 
the Bonferroni corrected level in functional play scores. There were, however, 
significant group differences in the scores for all levels of pretend play. Post hoc 
Bonferroni multiple comparisons revealed that in each case the autism group 
understood significantly fewer of the pretend actions than the two control groups. 
Group means and significant differences where they occurred are shown in Table 3. 
Entering VA as a covariate did not affect the results.  
[Place Table 3 about here] 
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Do Children With Autism Show Impaired Mentalising and Response Inhibition but 
Superior Local Processing Relative to Controls?  
A series of one-way ANOVAs using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .017 were 
performed to investigate whether there were any significant group differences on the 
measures of mentalising3, response inhibition, and local processing. There were 
significant group differences on all three measures and post hoc Bonferroni multiple 
comparisons revealed that the autism group scored significantly lower than the control 
groups on the measure on mentalising and response inhibition, and significantly 
higher than the controls of the measure of local processing. Group means and 
significant differences are shown in Table 4. The results remained unaltered when VA 
was entered as a covariate.  
[Place Table 4 about here] 
Can Performances on Measures of Mentalsing, Response Inhibition, and Local 
Processing Predict Comprehension of Pretense?  
Correlations between pretend play (aggregate score) and the predictor variables: VA, 
mentalising, response inhibition and local processing are shown in Table 5. With the 
exception of the local processing measure all variables showed a significant positive 
relationship with each other. Given that none of the relationships between the 
predictor variables exceeded .7 and that collinearity diagnostics indicated no cause for 
concern all of the predictor variables were retained in the subsequent regression 
analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).     
[Place Table 5 about here] 
A hierarchical multiple regression was performed to investigate the 
relationship between pretense and the predictor variables: VA, mentalising, response 
inhibition and local processing, after accounting for participant group. Participant 
  
15 
group was entered first using dummy codes (ID vs. autism and ID vs. TD), VA was 
entered into the second block and in the third block the measures of mentalising, 
response inhibition and local processing were entered simultaneously. As shown in 
Table 6, group accounted for 28% of the variance, F (2, 98) = 20.88, p < .001, in 
pretend play scores. Once the variance associated with group was removed there was 
a significant increase in R2 (∆R2 = .20), Fch (1, 97) = 38.04, p < .001. VA therefore 
explained a further 20% of the variance in pretend play scores. Once the variance 
associated with group and VA were removed there was another significant increase in 
R2 (∆R2 = .05), Fch (3, 94) = 3.24, p < .05. Performance on these three measures 
therefore explained an additional 5% of the variance in pretend play scores. However, 
of the three variables included in Step 3 only the mentalising measure (β = .24, p< 
.01) made a statistically significant contribution to the variance. The response 
inhibition measure (β = -.03, p = .72) and the local processing measure (β = -.06, p = 
.46) did not make unique contributions.  
[Place Table 6 about here] 
 
A final subsidiary aim was to investigate whether there were any group 
differences in the number of literal errors on the pretense task an ANOVA was 
performed. The results revealed that there were significant group differences, F (2, 
124) = 18.24, p < .001 partial η2 = .25. Post hoc Bonferroni multiple comparisons 
indicated that the autism group (M = 4.55, SD = 3.35) made significantly more literal 
errors than both control groups (p < .001) (M = 1.62, 1.57, SD = 2.00, 1.95, 
respectively) which did not differ from each other. Entering VA as a covariate did not 
alter the results.   
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A partial correlation controlling for VA was performed in order to investigate 
the relationship between number of literal errors and performance on the response 
inhibition task. The results revealed a significant negative correlation (r = -.34, n = 
119, p < .01). Better performance on the response inhibition task was associated with 
fewer literal errors. A similar set of results emerged when looking at the relationship 
between literal errors and mentalising (r = -.31, n = 125, p < .01) and local processing 
(r =.27, n = 107, p < .01). In the case of local processing, better performance was 
associated with more literal errors.   
 
Discussion 
Two preliminary aims of this study were: (1) to replicate an earlier study (Bigham, 
2008) showing that relative to matched controls children with autism have difficulty 
interpreting the pretend play, but not the functional play, of another person thereby 
supporting a competence deficit hypothesis rather than a performance deficit 
hypothesis; and (2) to replicate previous research showing that the performance of 
children with autism relative to controls is impoverished on measures assessing (a) 
mentalising and (b) response inhibition, but superior on a measure of (c) local 
processing.  The third and major aim of the study was (3) to explore whether 
performances on (a), (b) and (c) predict comprehension of pretense in order to 
empirically test the associated theoretical accounts.  
In relation to the first aim, the results of this study replicate the earlier findings 
(Bigham, 2008) and provide strong evidence to suggest that children with autism lack 
competence for some types of pretense. This is consistent with findings reported by 
Rutherford et al. (2007) but inconsistent with earlier reports of intact comprehension 
(Jarrold et al., 1994b; Kavanaugh & Harris, 1994). However, in both of these earlier 
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studies the children watched the experimenter pour an imaginary substance (e.g. tea) 
from an associated container (e.g. a teapot) onto a toy animal. It is possible that the 
use of appropriate props facilitated comprehension. Where this facilitation is absent, 
as was the case in both this study and Rutherford et al.’s study, children with autism 
show impaired comprehension. 
The second aim of the current study was to replicate previous research 
showing impaired mentalising and response inhibition, but superior local processing 
in children with autism relative to ability-matched controls. The results confirmed this 
pattern. This paved the way for investigating the major aim of this study, which was 
to explore if performances on measures of mentalising, response inhibition and local 
processing were associated with and predictive of pretense comprehension.  
In the regression analysis four variables, namely measures of VA, mentalising 
ability, response inhibition and local processing were entered as possible predictors 
after accounting for any variance associated with participant group. All of the 
predictor variables have been theoretically implicated in the development of pretense, 
as noted in the Introduction. The VA measure was strongly associated with pretense, 
confirming results of previous research showing a relationship between pretend play 
and language development (Haight & Miller, 1992) and more specifically that 
receptive language is related to pretend play (Lewis & Boucher, 1988). Assuming that 
both language and pretense require secondary representation (i.e. symbolization) then 
these results lend support to the symbolic deficit hypothesis (Baron-Cohen, 1987; 
Ricks & Wing, 1975). That is, impaired symbolization contributes to deficits in 
language, pretense, and mentalising.  
Of the remaining predictor variables (mentalising, response inhibition and 
local processing) only mentalising was a significant predictor of pretense after 
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removing all of the variance associated with group and VA. The correlations show 
that the mentalising and response inhibition measures were related and this is 
consistent with the suggestion that ToM tasks, such as those assessing mentalising, 
also require a degree of response inhibition (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). However, the 
observation that only mentalising significantly and independently predicted pretend 
play provides evidence of at least some independence of these variables. Conversely, 
lack of a significant relationship between mentalising and local processing tends to 
disconfirm the claim that performance on ToM tasks reflects a bias towards local 
processing as implied by Jarrold et al. (2000). However, this does not preclude an 
association between global processing and mentalising (Happé & Booth, 2008) as 
discussed below.   
The lack of an association between pretense and response inhibition suggests 
that difficulties with response inhibition are not linked to the impairments observed in 
the pretense of children with autism and supports previous findings (Jarrold, Boucher, 
& Smith, 1994a). Further support for this comes from the results connected with the 
subsidiary aim of the current study, namely an investigation of the relationship 
between number of literal errors and problems with response inhibition. Although 
there was a strong association between the number of literal errors and performance 
on the response inhibition measure, there were comparable relationships between 
literal errors and the mentalising and local processing measures. Increased literal 
errors in the autism group are therefore not uniquely associated with impaired 
response inhibition.  
The observation that pretend play was not associated with local processing is 
consistent with the findings of Morgan et al. (2003) who also reported no association. 
Taken together, these findings provide strong evidence to suggest that a local 
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processing bias is not associated with the deficits observed in the pretense of children 
with autism. However, recent research has led to the suggestion that local and global 
processing are two independent dimensions of weak coherence (Happé & Booth, 
2008). It remains possible therefore that problems with global, or integrative, 
processing might be associated with deficits in the pretense of children with autism, 
and this warrants further investigation.   
The results of the current research show that performance on the mentalising 
measure makes a significant and independent contribution to performance on the 
pretend play task over and above their possible shared reliance on symbolizing ability, 
with better performance on one being associated with better performance on the other. 
These findings suggest that some other ability contributing to success on mentalising 
tests is related to ability to interpret the pretense of another person. On the assumption 
that this ability is a capacity to represent mental states, then the results provide 
support for the mentalising deficit theory. This is consistent with the observation that 
children with autism lack early mind sharing behaviors, such as joint attention 
behaviors and, moreover, that early joint attention behaviors predict later ability to 
produce pretense (Rutherford et al., 2007). Interventions might therefore aim to 
facilitate both symbolizing and early mentalising ability in young children with 
autism.  
An obvious limitation of the current research is that only one measure of each 
cognitive construct was assessed. Future research should use a variety of different 
measures, which could yield different results. A further limitation is that only object 
substitution pretense and imaginary object pretense were assessed. Future research 
could investigate understanding of pretend properties and independent agency.    
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In conclusion, the results of the research reported here provide evidence to 
support a competence deficit hypothesis. That is, children with autism lack the 
competence for some types of pretense. Unique to this study was an empirical 
investigation of the relationship among comprehension of pretense and mentalising, 
response inhibition and local processing. Only the mentalising measure significantly 
and independently predicted performance on the pretend play task. These results are 
interpreted as providing empirical evidence to support the mentalising account and 
evidence against the competing theoretical alternatives invoking response inhibition 
or a local processing bias.   
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Footnotes 
 
       
1
 The term “metarepresentation” has been used to refer to different 
representational abilities. In referring to the ability to represent a representation, the 
term “secondary” representation (as used by Perner, 1991) is used throughout this 
paper.  
       
2
 Reproduced with permission from The British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology © The British Psychological Society.  
       
3
 Preliminary analyses indicated that performances within groups did not differ 
significantly between the self- and other-false belief tests therefore all between groups 
analyses were performed on a self- + other-false belief composite score.  
